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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LORIN .T. ELLISON, HARRY G. 1
ANDERSON and \VILLIAl\l A. I
DAYVSON, dba Famous Foods, a
limited partnership, and BILL A. !:
BA YES, administrator with the \Vill
annexed of the estate of Harrv G.
No.
~'tnderson, deceased,
·
\
10550
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

I
t

vs.

L. 13. JOHNSON and L YlHAN E.
PASSEY,
Defendants and Appellants.

f

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents agree with the Statement of
Fads set forth in Appellants' Brief with the exception
of the statement that one of the plaintiffs (Lorin J.
Ellison) represented to the defendants that the monthly
payments of Five :Hundred Forty-ffre Dollars
(*54..).00) for twenty-nine (29) months and Four
1

Hundred Forty-five Dollars ( $445.00) per month
thereafter would pay out the agreement during the terrn
of the Robinson lease. The record discloses (R. 69) tliai
the defendants offered to proye by the testimony of
the defendant, Lyman Passey, that .J-lr. Ellison represented to him that the agreement sued upon would bt
paid out by the end of the Robinson lease. This, of
course, is Mr. Passey's statement and is not confirmed
by Mr. Ellison. In fact, the trial court (R. G6) suggested that counsel for defendants call the plaintiff,
Mr. Ellison, as his first witness if they expected to prore
mutual mistake. Instead, counsel offered only the testimony of defendant, Lyman E. Passey.
We also call attention to the proffered proof of
the defendant Passey (R. 69), that .Mr. Ellison, with
the approval of Mr. Passey, changed the monthly figure
by increasing the amount and initialed it by the side of
the agreement. An examination of the agreement (R. 2)
(Pl. Ex. I, R. 63) discloses that the figure $545.00 mts
blurred and the last figure "5" was made plainer b>·
inserting the figure in ink above the blurred figure. The
only change thus made was a correction of a $j.OU
typographical error (R. 70).

It is the contention of the Respondents that thes'c
exceptions to the facts, as stated by the Appellants. ar 2
minor and have no bearing on the decision in this cas ~
and that the trial court was correct in granting its Sum·
marv
J ud<J'ment
Sua S ponte on the pleadings and state·
•
b
ments of counsel.

2

1

1

STATEMENT O.F POINTS
1. Judgment in this case is not required to Le

by Findings of .Fact and Conclusions of Law,
it being in the nature of a Summary Judgment awl the:
fact that findings and conclusions were not filed until
ni11etee11 ( 19) days after the judgment is harmless error.
~upported

On the basis of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and statement of counsel, the trial court wa~;
justified and not in error in failing to find a mutual
nmtake and failure of consideration.
~.

3. Parol evidence was inadmissable to vary the

terms of the written instrument.

ARGUMENT
JUDG.MENT IN THIS CASE IS N"OT
REQCIRED TO BE SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LA,Y, IT BEING IN THE NATURE O.F A
SC~BIARY JUDGMENT AND THE FACT
THAT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
'VERE NOT FILED UNTIL NINETEEX
(10) DAYS AFTER THE JUDGl\IENT IS
IL-\RMLESS ERROR.
1.

Rule 52 (a) of the Vtah Rules of Civil Procedure
pro,,itles that findings are unnecessary on decisions or
motions under Rule 12 or 56 (Summary Judgment).
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It is a matter of record that the judgment iu this

case was in the nature of a summary judgment base1;
on the pleadings and statement of counsel and y1·ouJ11
come within the scope of Rule 56 thereby making tht:
filing of findings and conclusions unnecessary. The
pleadings, including the answers to the written interrogatories and statement of counsel clearly indicarc
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Failure to make findings in such a case is not reversible
error if, when found, they must necessarily have bee11
adverse to the appellant. Groome v. Ogden City, 10
Utah 54, 37 Pac. 90; Petty v. St. George Garage, 60
Utah 126, 206 Pac. 720.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order unless ref us al to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of
the proceedings must disregard any error or
defect in the proceedings which does not a:ffel:t
the substantial rights of the parties." (Emphas1~
added.)
In this case the findings were not filed until nineteen ( 19) days after the judgment and then onl~· on
suggestion of Counsel for Defendant. Did this failure
affect the substantial rights of the parties? 1iVe think
not. This court has held, under a rule similar to Rule 61,
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that the failure to make findings under facts similar to
those in the present case is harmless error and not
grounds fur reversal. In Re: Love's Estate, 75 Utah 34~ •.
:285 Pac. 299; Snyder v. Allen, 51 Utah 291, l(H) Pac.
945.
~.

ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEAD-

INGS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES

AXD STATEMENT OF COUNSEL, THE
TlUAL COURT 'i\TAS JUSTIFIED AND NOT
IX ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND A _MU'1TAL i\IISTAKE AND FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
The facts in this case are clear and uncon trovertcd
except for the minor differences set forth in the Statement of Facts. They are as follows:
On the 1st day of November, 1955, the plaintiffs,
us sellers, and the defendants, as buyers, entered into
a simple unequivocal bargain and sale agreement. This
agreement provided that the plaintiffs sold to the defendants their lease on that certain store building located
at 13~2 East 21st South in Salt Lake City, Utah, tow·ther with market equipment described in the inventory
attached to the agreement. This agreement could htn-c
been more aptly described as a sales agreement rather
tha11 a lease agreement. The defendant buyers agreed
tii p:t)' for said lease, i1wentory and equipment the sum
of Thirty-nine 'l'housand Six Hundred Fifty and
9:2 mo Dollars ($39,650.92), payable Five I-Iundred
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Dollars ($500.00) on the lst day of November, 195.i,
Five Hundred Forty-five Dollars ($545.00) on the ht
day of each month thereafter for a period of twenty
nine ( 29) months, "then $445.00 on the 1st day of c11 ;:
month until the balance of said sum, together with.interest, as hereinafter specified, has been paid." (Emphasi 1
added.)
1

The agreement also provides:
"The buyers accept all of said propertr in ih
present condition and agree to assume tl;e lease
on said premises with the owner thereof and to
be bound by all of the terms and conditions thereof as the seller has been heretofore." (Emphasis
added.) (R. 44-45.)
In accord with the terms of this agreement, the
plaintiffs delivered the fixtures, inventory and lease to
the defendants and the defendants made payments to
the plaintiffs for over nine ( 9) years and at the same
time made monthly payments to the landlord (Doctor
Robinson) for the rental on said property. At the time
their lease expired in February of 1963, the defendants
were notified by the landlord that he would be unable
to renew their lease because the State Road Commissioll
was taking the property for a road-widening project.
The defendants held over for two (2) months beyond
the end of their lease and were then forced to ,-acatc.
At this time, there remained a balance owing to th·
plaintiffs of Five Thousand Seventeen and 25'100 Dollars ($5,017.25) together with interest. The abm·e fa~!.
' J
are admitted by the defend ants and are not contro,·eneri.
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To justify their refusal to pay the amount admittedly
remaining unpaid under the agreement (R. 18 and R.
:20), the defendants claimed there was a mutual mistake
and failure of consideration inasmuch as they were led
to believe by one of the plaintiffs (Mr. Ellison) that the
installment payments would pay the agreement out by
the end of' the lease which they purchased from the
plaintiffs.
There are numerous decisions by this court, including several by the present membership of the court,
holding that a contract can be reformed for mutual
mistake but setting down certain tests which must be
met before reformation is allowed.
A very scholarly discussion of these questions has
been made by .Mr. J. Thomas Greene in his article published in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 7, 1961, No. 3,
entitled "Mistake in the Utah Law of Contraots"
(a single copy of this treatise is enclosed with Respondents' brief). Mr. Greene sums up the general conclusions after applying the rules laid down in the numerous decisions by this court as follows:
"The well-settled general rule in Utah is that
a mistake on the part of one party only is not
redressable. Typical statements of the rule are
as follows:
"Equity will not reform a written contract
unless the mistake is proved to be the mistake
of both parties.
"A contract will not be reformed for a unilateral mistake.
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"A mistake on one side of a unilateral mistak('
of fac~ is_ ground for reversal only when sud1 mi.,take is mduced by fraud.'' Starley Y. Desen'
Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 7-:t P.2d 1221.
'

1

In the case of Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, relied
upon by the Appellants, the facts were conclusi,·e tb.l
a vital mistake was made by both parties and the rnurl
stated:
"As a matter of fact any other finding would
have rendered an absurd result, absurd in the ,
sense that the reason for the contract known t11
both parties would have been utterly ignored."
Applying the above reasoning to this case, the rern·,c
would be true. The plaintiffs and defendants entered
into a contract for the payment of an agreed anwwr
of money in monthly installments. There is no coutentiu11
made by the defendants that the balance sued upoH lia~
been paid. Defendants' only contention is that they were
informed by the plaintiffs that the contract vvottld pa!·
out sooner than it did and, therefore, they arc exl'nst:d
from paying the balance under the contract. If tlii1
reasoning were to be followed, the result would, w1dc
the holding in the Sine v. Harper case, have been ··absurd in the sense that the reason for the contract kumrn
to both parties would have been utterly ignored.''
1•

1

Aside from being clear and convincing, as detine'
in the Harper case, the proffered evidence in this case
indicates that no mistake was made as to the amo1111.
owing to the plaintiffs. This court has held that i;1 tii ·
absence of some misconduct on the part of the plainfr'',
8

the defendants cannot be released from the consequences
of its improvidence merely because the bargain is burdensome or unprofitable. Allen v. Bissinger, 62 Utah
:226, 219 Pac. 539.
The only excuse offered by the defendants for not
determining the payout period prescribed under the
eontract was as stated in the proffered testimony of the
defendant Passey that:
"He accepted Mr. Ellison's word as to the
computations because, as obviously it was a very
detailed and complicated mathematical problem
to figure out the amortization and the amount
would be paid on principal and interest each
month and finally arrived at the payment of the
amount the parties agreed to pay." (R. 69.)
This court has also held that unilateral mistake is
of no legal significance when documents are signed
without reading or without ascertaining the legal consequences of the document. Garff Realty v. Better
Building, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842; Accord v.
Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 254 P.2d 621.
It has also been held that where the person knows
the facts of the case but is ignorant of the legal consequences, he cannot claim mutual mistake. Board of

Education of Sevier School District v. Board of Education of Piute School District, 85 Utah 276, 39 P.2d
340; Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888.
This court has also held in A.{fhworth v. Charles".t'orth, 119 Utah 650, 231 P.2d 724, at page 728, that:

9

"Even assuming a mistake was made br th·
defendants, they were guilty of such carele;sne1;
in not seeing what they should have seen aud ii;
not obtaining readily available information tli,n
the trial court was not obligated to relieve then:
of their own neglect. The fault, if any, in tJij,
case appears to fall heavily upon the shoulder,
of the defendants."
See also Pomeroy on Equity J urispru<lencc 851) "ff
Fifth Edition, 1951.
This brings us to the contention of the Appellant.
on page 8 of their brief that the alleged mutual mistake
of fact "required the defendants to pay rent on a building from which they had been evicted." The undisputed
facts are that the issues sued upon in this case imolre
a bargain and sale agreement. The plaintiff sold to the
defendants for an agreed sum their lease, inventory and
fixtures. The defendants paid the rent to the landlord
(Doctor Robinson) for over nine ( 9) years until the
lease expired. There is no mention in the agreement
that any rents were to be paid to the plaintiffs nor were
any paid nor was this suit brought to compel def endunts
to pay rent on a building from which they had beeu
evicted. This suit was brought to collect the unpaid
balance which both parties agree remains unpaid under
the terms of the agreement.
The trial court was correct in finding: (R. 67-681
"Then you (the defendants) have got to gn
out now because you would only have had to pa:·
out more. If th~y hadn't macle a mistake. )'Oll
would h;ve to ha:,'e paid more each year."
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\Ve submit that under the undisputed facts in this
rnse, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment
Szw Spunte and that the rule quoted by Appellants from
Bullock v. Deseret Lodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah
:zd I, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960), gives the Appellants
110 support for their position. The rule quoted in this
case is as follows :
"A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions and inferences which when
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis
added.)
In this case there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. The defendants agreed to pay a fixed sum
of money in monthly installments until the account was
paid in full. The claim of the defendants that they were
led to believe that the contract would pay out sooner
than it did is not a material fact and would not sustain
a judgment in their favor. To do so would deprive the
plaintiff's of the fruits of their bargain and would result
in an inequity.

3. PAROL EVIDENCE WAS INADMIS-

SIBLE TO Y ARY THE TERMS OF THE
\VRITTEN INSTRUMENT.

The parol evidence rule is found in 78-25-16, Utah
Code lrnnotated, 1953. It reads as follows:
11

"1~h~re can be no evidence of the contents ril
a wntmg, other than the writing itself exe . ,
in the following cases . . . ."
' · e/Ji

1
1

•

Then follows a list of exceptions, none of which apph
to this case.
··
The general rule under this statute has been dii· \
cussed in Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theat, 1 :
82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294. The court in this case held.
'i

"In the absence, of fraud or mistake, parol eridence is not admissable to contradict, varv or add
to or subtract from the terms of a valid. writtell
instrument."
See also McCornick v. Levy, 37 Utah 134, 106 Pac. tHiO:
Moran Inc. v. First Security Corp., 82 Utah 3Hi, ~±
P.2d 384; Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erid:sen, 82 Utah
475, 25 P.2d 952; Jones on Evidence, Second Edition.
285, Page on Contracts, Vol. 4, 2164.

It is recognized that oral testimony ca11 be received to correct a mistake which results in an injustict
and to, of course, modify the parol evidence rule. Si11c
v. Harper, supra, and Fox Film Corporation t'. O,r;dt1r
Theatre, supra.
However, the alleged mistakes claimed by the defendants in this case do not involve a material fact, nor
would they result in an injustice so as to bring the 1'1
within the exception of the parol evidence statute (ar'~ 1 i·
men ts on this question are covered in Point No. 2) ·
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1

1.

The defendants argue that because they did not
have the use of the building beyond the term of their
lease they were unable to operate their store and thus
procure the means by which to pay plaintiffs the balance
due under the contract. (R. 68). This, under the authorities cited, offers no excuse. Allen v. Bissinger, supra.
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"There is no claim of misrepresentation or
fraud against the defendant. It may well be that
the reports proved useless and of no value to
defendant, and that in volume and price they
exceeded its expectations, but in the absence of
some misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, the
defendant cannot be relieved from the consequences of its improvidence, merely because the
bargain is burdensome and unprofitable."
See also Fujikaya v. Sunrise Water Company, 158
F.2d 490, 492 and A.L.R.2d 27.

CONCLUSION
There was no mutual mistake of any material matter which would justify the court in setting aside the
parol evidence rule nor would any injustice result if
the defendants were required to comply with the terms
of their contract. On the other hand, it would be inequitable to permit the defendants to avoid payment of
the sums which admittedly remain unpaid on the contract sued upon. There were sufficient facts admitted
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1
by the defendants through their pleadings, offer of proo)
and Statement of Counsel to justify the summary judg·
ment of the trial court and the same should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
'iVILLIA:J\;1 A. DA 'VSON
2627 Nottingham 'iV ay
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
HENRY D. MOYLE, JR.
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents
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